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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Doran Carl Eslinger appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to
suppress.

He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress

because, under the circumstances presented—specifically, the fact that his vehicle was
parked in the parking lot of a courthouse when a drug dog alerted on the driver’s side
door—the police officers should have obtained a search warrant prior to searching his
vehicle.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On September 3, 2014, a drug dog alerted on the driver’s side door of a Honda
Civic parked in the parking lot of the Clearwater County District Court.
Tr., p.6, L.21 – p.7, L.2, p.7, Ls.19-21; R., pp.12, 14.)

(10/27/14

The vehicle belonged to

Mr. Eslinger, who had driven to the courthouse with his wife so that she could attend a
hearing. (R., p.12.) Mr. Eslinger’s vehicle was singled out for a drug sniff because
officers suspected he was involved in the distribution of methamphetamine. (R., p.12.)
Mr. Eslinger was intercepted by police officers as he exited the courthouse and
was asked to consent to a search of his vehicle. (10/27/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.3-14; R., p.12.)
The following exchange took place outside the courthouse:
Detective Deitrick: Hey, we just had a drug dog hit on your car, so what
we’re doing right now is we’re applying for a search warrant, unless you
would like to give us consent to search your car.
Mr. Eslinger: Well, I don’t know why it would hit on our car.
Detective Deitrick: Well, it did, and we—basically right now we’re going to
apply for a warrant and impound the car and search it.
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Detective Jared: Or you can give consent. Well, just do it faster. We’re
going to do it either way.
Mr. Eslinger: Yeah, I know. Well, you can look. I don’t know.
(9/3/14 Tr., p.2, Ls.6-19.) The officers interpreted Mr. Eslinger’s statement to indicate
consent, and they proceeded to search his vehicle. (10/27/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-14.)
Police officers found two black bags and a small brown pouch on the floor of
Mr. Eslinger’s vehicle, just in front of the driver’s seat. (10/27/14 Tr., p.7, Ls.18-25;
R., p.12.) The officers opened one of the bags and found a glass pipe with residue on it
and a plastic bag containing a white crystalline substance. (10/27/14 Tr., p.8, Ls.7-15;
R., p.12.) At that point, the officers stopped the search and arrested Mr. Eslinger for
possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Tr., p.8, Ls.16-19; R., pp.13, 24.)

(10/27/14

After obtaining a search warrant, the officers

continued their search of Mr. Eslinger’s vehicle and found methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia. (10/27/14 Tr., p.8, L.24 – p.9, L.19; R., pp.13, 27-28.)
Mr. Eslinger was charged by Information with possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.75-76.)
Mr. Eslinger filed a motion to suppress arguing that the evidence found in his vehicle
should be suppressed because he did not voluntarily consent to the search. (R., pp.8792.) The State filed a memorandum in opposition arguing that Mr. Eslinger’s consent
was valid and, if not, the search was still proper pursuant to the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement. (R., pp.104-08.) Following a hearing, the district court issued
an order denying Mr. Eslinger’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.130-35.) The district court
concluded that the State did not meet its burden of proving that Mr. Eslinger voluntarily
consented to the search of his vehicle.

(R., p.132.)
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However, the district court

concluded that the drug dog’s alert on Mr. Eslinger’s vehicle gave the officers probable
cause to search the vehicle without a warrant. (R., p.133.)
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, Mr. Eslinger pled guilty to
possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal from the denial of his
motion to suppress, and the State agreed to dismiss the other charge and recommend a
suspended sentence. (9/30/15 Tr., p.6, L.11 – p.9, L.2; R., pp.145-46, 150.) The
district court sentenced Mr. Eslinger to a suspended sentence of four years, with two
years fixed, and placed Mr. Eslinger on supervised probation for a period of three years.
(R., p.159.) The judgment was entered on December 1, 2015, and Mr. Eslinger filed a
timely notice of appeal on December 22, 2015. (R., pp.163-68, 169-71, 185-89.)

3

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Eslinger’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Eslinger’s Motion To Suppress
Mr. Eslinger contends the district court erred when it denied his motion to
suppress because his vehicle was initially searched without his consent and without a
search warrant. The district court correctly concluded that Mr. Eslinger’s consent was
not valid because it was involuntary. (R., p.132.) The district court erred, however, in
concluding the search was nonetheless permissible because it was supported by
probable cause.

Mindful of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,

Mr. Eslinger contends that, under the circumstances presented—specifically, the fact
that his vehicle was parked in the parking lot of a courthouse—the officers violated the
Fourth Amendment by searching his vehicle without first obtaining a search warrant.
“In reviewing a district court order granting or denying a motion to suppress
evidence, the standard of review is bifurcated.” State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207
(2009) (citation omitted). “This Court will accept the trial court’s findings of fact unless
they are clearly erroneous.

However, this Court may freely review the trial court’s

application of constitutional principles in light of the facts found.” Id. (citations omitted).
“At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial
court.”

State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 562, 112 P.3d 848, 850 (Ct. App. 2005)

(citations omitted).
Mr. Eslinger acknowledges that the drug dog’s alert provided probable cause to
search his vehicle. However, he contends that the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement should not apply because the police officers could have so easily obtained
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a search warrant.

Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a

warrant is not required to search a vehicle “when there is probable cause to conclude
that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances exist due to
the vehicle’s mobility and likelihood the evidence may be lost or destroyed.” State v.
Gonzales, 117 Idaho 518, 519 (1990). A drug dog’s alert can provide probable cause
for a search pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. See,
e.g., State v. Braendle, 134 Idaho 173, 176 (Ct. App. 2000). Mindful of this case law,
Mr. Eslinger contends that the public policy considerations underlying the automobile
exception are not implicated here, where the police officers could have obtained a
search warrant by simply walking a short distance to the courthouse.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Eslinger respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse
the district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case to the
district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 7th day of June, 2016.
___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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